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Abstract The paper reports on a field experiment conducted among poor women orga-
nized in self-help groups in the north-east of India. The experiment tests in a simple game
whether overly optimistic expectations with respect to the benefits of exercising agency
reduces one’s appreciation of remaining with agency in the future. If so, unrealistic
expectations may trigger behaviour that jeopardizes empowerment processes. It is
hypothesized that negative emotions, such as disappointment, bring about such risks. We
find that overstretched expectations may indeed work against empowerment if the gap
between achieved and expected outcomes following increased agency is sufficiently wide.
However, modest expectation gaps have the opposite effect and tend to promote attitudes
conducive to empowerment. A tentative explanation for this result is offered by combining
insights from recent work on the role of aspirations.
Keywords Empowerment  Subjective well-being  Expectations
1 Introduction
The current debate on what constitutes well-being is dominated by the controversy
between the capability approach on the one hand and the happiness or subjective well-
being (SWB) approach on the other. A forceful argument to prioritize capabilities rather
than subjective well-being is the alleged malleability of the latter. In the context of poverty,
it is often argued that the poor manage to adapt to their material deprivation by adjusting
aspirations and desires downwards. Empirical studies lend some support to this ‘hedonic
adaptation’ argument, as documented in Clark (2007, p. 6). For instance, Biswas-Diener
and Diener (2001) find that poor slum dwellers in Kolkata do not report significantly lower
general life satisfaction than a more affluent control group in the same city. Survey data
from South Africa also reveal at least partial adaptation to income poverty and low
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educational performance (Barr and Clark 2007). This human ability to come to terms with
one’s deprivation may partly explain why development researchers have been reluctant,
with some notable exceptions,1 to embrace the SWB approach, and have invested in the
operationalization of Sen’s idea of capabilities instead. A clear illustration is the rise to
prominence of the concept of empowerment in development circles. Viewed as the
‘‘expansion in people’s ability to make strategic life choices in a context where this ability
was previously denied to them’’ (cf. Kabeer 1999, p. 437), empowerment is conceptually
very close to enhancing capabilities, which aims to expand people’s freedom to live the life
that one values.2
Adoption of empowerment as the central development objective does not imply,
however, that SWB can be safely ignored. While SWB may adapt to one’s capability set,
the empowerment process at the same time is responsive to people’s SWB. Diener and
Biswas-Diener (2005) argue that emotional well-being determines in part the success of
psychological empowerment processes. The authors warn that ‘‘negative emotions can stop
the cycle of psychological empowerment’’ (pp. 5–6). If the aim is to generate self-sus-
taining empowerment processes, this warning calls for the identification of features of
development initiatives that may jeopardize the SWB of its participants in an early stage.
While few evaluation studies of development programs consider well-being as an explicit
indicator of success or failure, evidence is available for one of the most popular and
celebrated interventions aimed at empowerment, i.e., micro-credit provision to women’s
groups. While this is sometimes used as a mere poverty alleviation tool, the income
generated by group lending to poor women is generally regarded as an instrument towards
the broader goal of transferring decision-making power into the hands of women. Eco-
nomic empowerment is assumed to spill over to the social and psychological domain.3
Ahmed et al. (2001) compare self-reports of emotional well-being between Bangladeshi
women participating in a micro-credit scheme of BRAC, a well-known non-governmental
organization, and non-participating women. On the basis of a survey covering 198 BRAC
and 1,169 non-BRAC households, the authors find that the higher a women’s perceived
contribution to household income, the more likely, ceteris paribus, she is to report emo-
tional stress. This not only leads to the result that BRAC women fail to show less emotional
stress than their non-BRAC counterparts, it also shows that BRAC-women who are more
effective in using micro-credit to generate household income are more emotionally stressed
than BRAC-women who perform poorly in this respect. Interestingly, it is especially during
the first 3 years of participation in BRAC that emotional stress increases, which leads the
authors to argue that ‘‘by promoting women’s involvement in household income generation,
emotional stress is provoked among new recipients’’ (Ahmed et al. 2001, p. 1964). This
negative effect on SWB of early empowerment seems to have translated into behavioural
attitudes that go against the spirit of empowerment as well. When asked about their
responses to emotional stress, BRAC-members ‘‘were more likely to adopt a fatalistic or
resigned attitude than non-members, whether poor or better-off’’ (ibid., p. 1962).
The authors put forward two factors that may be important in bringing about these
intriguing results. First, the defiance and transgression of traditional gender roles in a
1 See e.g. Rojas (2008) and Guillen-Royo (2008) for poverty analyses using a subjective well-being
approach for Mexico and Peru, respectively.
2 See Stern et al. (2005, p. 103) and Alsop et al. (2006, pp. 15–16) for explicit acknowledgement of the
similarity between the concept of empowerment and Sen’s capabilities approach.
3 Some authors contest the empowerment potential of micro-credit programmes. See Kabeer (2001) for an
overview and analysis of the debate.
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patriarchal social set-up may create anxieties and tensions for starting female entrepre-
neurs. Second, and this is a less obvious one, the negative impact on SWB may be due to
the ‘‘discrepancy between expectations and achievement’’ (p. 1957).4 The researchers seem
to refer to the idea in psychology that ‘‘initial improvements may produce expectations of
future improvements and create frustration when the anticipated improvements do not
occur or are not realized quickly enough’’ (Frederick and Loewenstein 1999, p. 308).
While the supposition of overly optimistic expectations is not further substantiated in the
paper, we take interest in the question whether this could indeed negatively impact on
SWB such that it generates behaviour that works against empowerment. Hence, the
question we aim to address in the current paper is whether expectation shortfalls entail the
risk of bringing the empowerment process to a halt within the context of the empowerment
of women living in poor and traditional societies.
Ideally, one would like to analyze this potential problem in a longitudinal study, where
women participating in a certain empowerment initiative are periodically asked for their
expectations, their emotional well-being and their achievements on a set of empowerment
indicators to detect how these interlink over time. The hypothesis would be that those
individuals who start out with very high expectations, all other things equal, report lower
SWB in the process and end up being less empowered. In order to perform a preliminary
test of this hypothesis, we take a shortcut by mimicking part of the empowerment process
in a simple game. Our ambition in doing so does not extend beyond indicating whether it
would be worthwhile to undertake a longitudinal study that addresses the question at hand
in a more realistic setting than the experimental one designed here.
The game, which consists of three stages, aims to capture the essential feature of
empowerment, i.e., enhanced freedom to make one’s own strategic choices (enhanced
agency). The first stage features a scenario where participants do not have any control over
their strategy in the game, whereas they gain full control over it in a second stage. After
playing this second stage, each participant casts a vote to indicate whether she prefers to play
the third stage with or without control over one’s strategy. Since the voting options are such
that expected payoffs in the third stage are roughly similar across both scenarios, the par-
ticipant’s vote is taken to reflect her propensity to give up the freedom to determine her own
strategy. While obviously very stylized, we believe the simplicity of the game is at the same
time a merit. Since the success of women empowerment initiatives likely hinges on a myriad
of factors (such as the attitude of male family members), using the field as a ‘laboratory’
rules out at least some of these, which might otherwise obscure a potential effect from
expectations or, more generally, what psychologists refer to as ‘feedforward’ processes.
Unfortunately, the experimental gaming method does not lend itself easily to a simu-
lation of the negative emotions that are believed to stem from unmet expectations. The
duration of the game is too short for frustration to build up. Participants are therefore
unlikely to report the types of emotional stress that are experienced by the women in Ahmed
et al. (2001) and Omorodion (2007). Nonetheless, we believe that the fact that the game is
played with real stakes may invoke sufficient disappointment in participants to trigger
behavioural reactions. While focusing in the results section on these behavioural responses,
an effort will be made to make a connection with levels of subjective well-being.
The experiment was conducted with female members of self-help credit and savings
groups in India’s north-eastern state of Orissa. Some background on the research location,
4 Omorodion (2007) also hints at unrealistic expectations as a contributing factor to emotional stress (e.g.
depression, high blood pressure and withdrawal syndrome) among female members of micro-credit groups
in Nigeria.
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with special emphasis on women’s status, is provided in Sect. 2. The details of the
experiment, which we believe is novel in its set-up, are described in Sect. 3. Section 4
presents the results, followed by an interpretation of these in Sect. 5, which draws heavily
on the notion of aspirations. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes.
2 Women Empowerment in Orissa
Orissa is one of the least-developed states in India, featuring the highest income poverty rate
in the country, with close to half of the population earning an income below the poverty line
(Government of Orissa 2004, pp. 20–21). Non-income development indicators for this state
also tend to fall short of the all-India average by a substantial margin. For example, life
expectancy at birth is much lower for both men and women (see Table 1). The fact that the
difference for women (-7.2 years) exceeds that for men (-3.8 years) is indicative of a
relatively high level of gender inequality in Orissa compared to other Indian states.
Within Orissa living conditions and women’s status vary substantially across districts.
For our field experiment we selected two districts that capture some of this intra-regional
variation, i.e., Balangir and Puri. The Balangir district in the state’s interior forms part of
an area that is considered one of the poorest on the Indian subcontinent (ibid., p. 24).
Chronic drought conditions are responsible for high levels of food insecurity and extreme
income poverty. Roughly a third of the population is classified as ‘very poor’. While
Balangir’s human development index (HDI) is below the state’s average (see Table 1), the
coastal district of Puri shows an above-average performance on human development. This
notwithstanding, a mixed picture emerges from Table 1 regarding its record on gender bias
and women empowerment. Decision-making power in the private sphere is likely to be
higher for women in Puri than in Balangir. Whereas more than half of the women in
Balangir married before entering (legal) adulthood, this is the case for only one out of
every seven women in Puri. Regarding family planning, a lower share of women having a
third or higher-order birth is reported for Puri, which points in the same direction.
Although Balangir is generally considered to have a more traditional value orientation
concerning gender roles, this does not imply that more developed districts like Puri are not
Table 1 Selected development and gender-inequality indicators: Balangir, Puri and all-Orissa
Balangir Puri Orissa
Human development index (HDI), 2004 0.546 0.657 0.579
Share of population below poverty line 0.49 0.45 0.48
Female life expectancy at birth (years), [all-India: 66.9] NA NA 59.7
Male life expectancy at birth (years), [all-India: 63.9] NA NA 60.1
Female infant mortality rate (per 1,000), 1999 98 75 96
Male infant mortality rate (per 1,000), 1999 96 70 97
Sex ratio: females per 1,000 males in 0–6 years age group 967 921 950
Female literacy rate (%) 39 68 51
Male literacy rate (%) 70 89 76
Share of women married below 18 years of age 0.58 0.14 0.36
Share of women having 3rd or higher-order birth 0.45 0.37 0.45
Source: Government of Orissa (2004). Data refer to 2001, unless otherwise indicated
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endowed with institutions and norms that discriminate against women. The existing gender
bias manifests itself in Puri in an extremely unfavourable female-to-male sex ratio (see
Table 1). The Government of Orissa (2004) claims with regard to the alarming figures for
Puri and other better-off coastal districts that ‘‘better access to sex determination tests
through ultrasound and amniocentesis techniques has resulted in female infanticides in
large numbers during the early stages of pregnancy’’. The relatively low prevalence of sex-
selective abortion in Balangir can partly be explained by limited access to sex determi-
nation techniques, but may also be due to the high share of Scheduled Tribes (ST) in its
population. Tribal people make up 22% of Balangir’s population against only 3% of Puri’s.
While their low status in Orissan society entails high levels of economic deprivation, tribal
communities have more equal gender relations compared to communities of Scheduled
Castes (SC), Other Backward Classes (OBC) and non-scheduled castes. Dowry-related
violence against women, such as dowry homicide and dowry torture, is much less common
in tribal than in non-tribal areas of the state, for example (ibid., p. 153).
An attitudinal survey that we carried out in 2008 among 388 randomly selected women
from eight rural communities in Balangir (197 respondents) and Puri (191 respondents)
sheds additional light on the level of women empowerment in these districts. Before
examining selected attitudes, let us first briefly characterise the sample. In terms of marital
status, 90% of the interviewed women are married, 5% are widowed, and the remaining
respondents are either unmarried or divorced. The women in the sample are predominantly
Hindu (87%), while Christians and Muslims represent 9 and 4% of the total, respectively.
Close to 80% of the interviewed women belong to a disadvantaged social group (ST, SC or
OBC), which is reflected in a poor educational profile. Only 20% has qualifications beyond
primary school and more than 40% has not received any formal education. Half of the
surveyed women indicate to be employed at the time of the survey. Within this category,
the largest group consists of agricultural wage labourers, followed by waged workers
outside agriculture.
Respondents were asked to indicate their level of (dis)agreement with a set of state-
ments on a five-point scale (1 = ‘strongly disagree’, 5 = ‘strongly agree’), one of which
reads as follows: ‘I have control over my own life’. About 17% of the sample disagrees and
another 5% strongly disagrees with this statement. Three-quarters of those who indicate
such a lack of agency are part of the Balangir sub-sample. A comparison of the mean
scores in the two districts on this item confirms this difference in perceived agency. The
average Balangir respondent scores 3.1, which is significantly lower than the average score
of 4.3 reported by Puri respondents (Mann–Whitney test; z = -9.83, P \ 0.001).
A better understanding of the actual degree of agency that respondents are able to
exercise in daily life can be obtained by examining their opinions regarding gender rela-
tions. For example, 54% agrees (of which most even strongly so) to the statement that ‘men
are entitled to command their women’. Independent decision-making is clearly not the
norm, as is also witnessed by the fact that 51% answers in the negative when asked whether
they are able to visit a doctor without asking permission from a male person. In addition,
the survey shows substantial tolerance to physical abuse on the part of men. Four out of
every ten women condone wife-beating in case the woman has been cheating on her
husband and three out of ten believe that women who are experiencing domestic violence
tend to have themselves to blame for it. Interestingly, the statement that ‘the dowry system
is a fair system’ meets with little support. Only 15% of the respondents agree that it is fair,
while 58% strongly disagrees. On the whole, the attitudes of women from Balangir district
attest more strongly to a lack of empowerment than those expressed by respondents from
Puri.
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The main strategy to empower women in Orissa (as in most parts of India) is through
the creation of women self-help groups (SHGs). Although several distinct SHG models
exist, savings and credit tend to form the strategy’s core component, starting with an initial
period of collective savings to facilitate inter-group lending, which over time matures into
groups (or clusters of groups) taking larger loans from external parties like banks or donor
agencies. SHG models designed by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) tend to
complement their facilitating role in the loan and savings programme more substantially
with activities that directly aim to promote women’s rights to resources, identity, political
participation, information and justice than SHG programmes initiated by government
agencies (Jakimow and Kilby 2006, p. 381). The relevance of SHGs in the Indian context is
witnessed by the fact that ‘‘the SHG has become the unit of development intervention, with
the majority of programmes aimed at women implemented with existing or newly
organised SHGs’’ (ibid., p. 382). For this reason we also conduct our experiment with
SHGs rather than with other possible constellations.
3 The Field Experiment
The experiment was conducted in four villages in the Balangir district and six villages in
the Puri district in the period February–March 2008.5 The villages were selected on the
criterion that they should be as representative as possible for their respective districts’ rural
areas and preferably be included in the aforementioned survey on female attitudes. In total,
a number of 15 SHGs, ranging in size from 9 to 11 members, participated in the experi-
mental game. Nine SHGs (93 individuals) were recruited for the game in Balangir and six
groups (63 individuals) in Puri. The actual game sessions, which lasted for about an hour
per group, were generally organized in public spaces such as a community centre or
primary school, but occasionally also in the patio of one of the group members’ dwellings.
Local research assistants explained the game to the participants in their vernacular, i.e., a
dialect of Oriya.
The game consists of three stages. In the first stage participants play a trivial game of
chance. Each of them receives seven coins of a particular colour and throws a die to decide
how many coins from this endowment are put into a common pot, while keeping the
remaining ones. Subsequently, after all participants have put their coins, two coins are
randomly drawn from the pot by the experimenter. These are the winning coins that
determine the payoff for the entire group. The rules of the game are such that the amount of
money that is won (and will later be added to the group’s savings account) increases with
the number of coins that remain with the owner of a winning coin. Hence, the higher the
number that comes up on the die for a particular participant, the higher the probability that
one of the randomly selected winning coins will belong to her, but the lower the corre-
sponding payoff. Since the game deals with collective rather than individual payoffs, it is
in principle irrelevant whose coins are drawn. What matters is that coins are drawn that are
relatively rare in the pot, as this generates the highest payoff for the group. Even though
participants cannot influence this and therefore should not care at all to whom the winning
coins belong, it is conceivable that participants enjoy some kind of ‘warm glow’ feeling in
case it is one of their own coins that makes a contribution to group savings, given that the
colour of one’s coins is public knowledge. The game of chance is played for three rounds
5 The Balangir villages include Bidighat, Janakpur, Sibthala and Talijarana. In Puri, the experiment was
conducted in Bada Sri Mukha, Ghodasalia, Jagiri Tainabad, Juanlo Beheresani, Ratilo and Viligram.
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and the respective payoffs are added up and communicated to the participants (see the
Appendix for the exact game instructions).
The second stage consists of another three rounds of the same game, but after removing
the element of chance. Instead of using a random device to decide how many coins to put
in the pot and how many are kept, the participants are now granted the freedom to decide
for themselves. The only restriction is that they must put at least one coin and keep at least
one. It can easily be seen that the group payoff is maximized when each participant
chooses to put only one coin in the pot and remains with six. If the participants manage to
coordinate on this Nash-equilibrium, or even with an occasional deviating player, the
payoff per round in this ‘empowered’ condition exceeds that of the first stage. This feature
of the experiment captures the idea that taking control over one’s actions will generally
result in better (pecuniary and/or non-pecuniary) outcomes than when adopting a fatalistic
attitude, especially when others do the same and better outcomes require collective action.6
Note that the participants are not allowed to discuss the optimal strategy amongst each
other, so that they have to rely on their own capacity to solve for it, which may require
some learning-by-doing, or infer the best response from imitating others. Again three
rounds are played under this set of rules.
The third and final stage consists of either playing two extra rounds of the game as in
stage I (by throwing a die) or, alternatively, one extra round as in stage II (own decision).
The players in each group decide for one of these two options by simple majority voting.
Each player indicates her individual preference by casting an anonymous vote in favour or
against reintroducing the chance element. The difference in number of rounds (2:1) serves
to roughly equalize (in expected value terms) the extra group payoff to be obtained in stage
III, since a round in which participants make their own decision tends to generate a payoff
roughly twice as high on average. Equalizing the expected payoff across the two options
allows us to isolate the value that participants attach to being able to control their actions
rather than these being governed by fate (or ‘‘karma’’ in the Indian context), regardless of
the outcomes that are achieved by these. Put differently, we aim to measure the value of
experiencing agency. Following Kabeer (1999), the notion of agency extends beyond the
mere freedom to act according to one’s own discretion and also includes the sense of
agency, which captures ‘‘the meaning, motivation and purpose which individuals bring to
their activity, […] or ‘the power within’’’ (p. 438).
The hypothesis to be tested is whether the value of having agency declines when the
benefits of enhanced decision-making power did not live up to prior expectations.
Therefore, participants are requested after stage I to state their expectation regarding the
group’s total payoff in stage II. In order to provide an incentive to think carefully about this
expectation level, participants are told that the individual whose expectation comes closest
to the actual payoff will be awarded a small prize. The observed difference between the
expected and achieved payoff in stage II (henceforth referred to as ‘expectation gap’)
should be systematically related to the voting behaviour after this stage, since the latter is a
proxy for participants’ valuation of exercising agency.
In addition to the elicitation of expectations, participants are requested to express their
level of satisfaction with their group’s payoff after stage I and again after stage II. The aim
is to capture potential disappointment with the gains from empowerment in stage II. The
experiment concludes by calculating the overall payoff for the group over the three stages
of the experiment and handing over the corresponding amount in cash to the secretary of
6 Rowlands (1997), for instance, stresses that overcoming fatalistic attitudes is a key challenge in the
empowerment process of poor women in developing countries.
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the SHG. Total group earnings varied from Rs. 250 to 500, which implied individual
earnings in the range of 2–3 international dollars.7
4 Results
Let us first check to what extent participants’ expectation concerning the monetary payoff
in the agency condition (YˆA) exceeded the payoff actually achieved by the group under this
set of rules (YA), as this is the assumed root of the problem. We define the expectation gap
as follows: g ¼ Y^A  YA
 
=YA: The distribution of participants over g is depicted in Fig. 1.
Note that the horizontal axis has been rescaled exponentially for presentational purposes.
Expectations turn out to have been too optimistic (g [ 0) for 69% of the participants ex
post. At the median, the gap equals 0.9, which implies that the expected payoff exceeds the
actual payoff by 90%. For the remainder of the analysis, we subdivide participants with
g [ 0 into two groups; those with a ‘moderate’ expectation gap (0 \ g B 1) and those with
a ‘wide’ gap (g [ 1). The cut-off point at g = 1 is arbitrary, but intuitive in the sense that
beyond this point the expected payoff is more than twice the actual payoff, which suggests
that participants are clearly off the mark. The idea behind the categorization is to set off
Fig. 1 Cumulative distribution of participants according to expectation gap
7 According to recent World Bank data (2008), $PPP 1 = Rs. 14.67.
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this group from the rest, since these participants, who constitute 46.8% of the sample, form
the high-risk group in our hypothesis and therefore warrant special attention.
A preliminary insight into the relation between g and the value that participants attach to
having agency after experiencing g can be obtained by comparing the voting behaviour
across the three ‘expectation gap’ categories, as shown in Fig. 2. For the group who did not
experience a (positive) expectation gap (g B 0), we observe an equal split between votes
in favour and against reintroducing the chance element in stage III. Surprisingly, those
experiencing a moderate gap are less likely to vote in favour of this zero-agency condition.
In line with our hypothesis, however, those facing a wide gap between expectation and
achievement are more likely to do so. Over the whole sample, 52% voted in favour of
‘throwing a die’ instead of making one’s own decision. This resulted in five out of fifteen
groups voting in majority to continue in the agency condition and seven groups reverting to
the chance game. In two groups the votes were tied.
The pattern in Fig. 2 needs to be interpreted with caution for two reasons. First, dif-
ferent perceptions about which option, the one with or without agency, will generate the
highest monetary payoff may have emerged across groups due to idiosyncratic game–play.
While the options were designed such that expected payoffs should be roughly equal, there
is no guarantee that participants held this perception, especially in groups where outcomes
Fig. 2 Voting behaviour by size of expectation gap
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were atypically high or low in certain stages. Let us therefore define a measure ak that
captures the relative attractiveness of the non-agency and agency condition in terms of
payoff generation for participants in group k:
ak ¼ 2  YkN=3
 
=YkA3:
The assumption is that participants compare the average payoff that the group managed
to earn over the three rounds in the first, or non-agency (N), stage to the payoff earned in
the third round of the second stage (A3), with a correction for the difference in number of
extra rounds on offer (2:1). The motivation for taking the payoff from the last round rather
than the average payoff over all three rounds in the second stage is the fact that consid-
erable learning was observed from one round to the other. It took most groups one or
sometimes two rounds to settle on the optimal group strategy of putting only one coin.
Once they experience the high payoff from this strategy, it is unlikely that they revert to a
sub-optimal strategy in an extra round. Groups that managed to coordinate on the optimal
solution from the first agency round onwards, for instance, largely adhered to it throughout
the two subsequent rounds. On the other extreme, four groups failed to come close to the
optimal solution even after three rounds. Hence, there seems no reason for the members of
these groups to expect much higher payoffs from agency in an additional round. While ak
is very close to 1 (equal degree of attractiveness) on average over all groups (l = 0.99;
r = 0.14), its value ranges from 0.67 to 1.22 for individual groups. We will therefore
include ak as a control variable when performing a logistic regression on the likelihood that
an individual participant votes in favour of agency.
A second factor that we like to control for is one that may increase an individual’s
valuation of agency but is unrelated to expectations, namely one’s own contribution to the
total group payoff in stage II, which we denote by dik as follows:
dik ¼ yAð Þi= YAð Þk where Y ¼
X
i
y:
This expression captures the idea that exercising agency feels more rewarding in case it
turns out that it is your decision that actually matters for the group. The link between high
payoffs and enhanced decision-making power is less salient otherwise. About 42% of the
participants did not make any contribution to the group payoff in Stage II, whereas others
contributed up to 30–40% of the total.
Table 2 reports on the logistic regression results performed to explain the voting
behaviour in the experiment, which broadly confirm the univariate picture observed in
Fig. 2. Participants who experienced a moderate (wide) expectation gap are significantly
more (less) likely to vote in favour of agency compared to those who did not face an
expectation shortfall (omitted category). The variables a and d have the expected sign, but
are not significant. Finally, a dummy variable was included to analyse whether participants
from Puri attach more value to agency than Balangir residents, given that the empower-
ment indicators discussed in Sect. 2 suggest more decision-making power in the household
for women in Puri. While the sign of the coefficient points in this direction, the effect is
rather weak.
It is interesting to observe that the most pronounced difference in the valuation of
agency is not between those to the left and right of the g = 0 line in Fig. 1, but between the
groups with moderate and wide expectation gaps. If we run the same logistic regression
leaving out those with g B 0, the difference in the probability of voting in favour or against
agency between the two groups is significant at the 1% level. According to the odds ratio
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estimate, a participant that experienced a moderate gap is five times more likely to vote in
favour of retaining agency than her counterpart with a wide gap. If the low valuation of
agency in the latter group is the result of unmet expectations, we should also expect lower
reported levels of satisfaction after stage II for this group, especially compared to those
with a moderate gap, since they show the starkest disparity in voting behaviour. When
analyzing the role of SWB, therefore, we concentrate on a comparison between these two
groups.
A complication with regard to detecting potential differences in reported SWB is that
participants’ satisfaction levels were generally high after the second stage as a result of a
marked increase in payoffs between stages I and II. None of the participants indicated to be
‘not at all satisfied’ and only 10% was reportedly ‘not so satisfied’ with the achieved
payoff. Nonetheless, the likelihood that a participant was ‘very satisfied’ (as opposed to
‘somewhat satisfied’ or an occasional ‘not so satisfied’) might be informative. Within the
group with a moderate gap, the proportion of respondents indicating that they were ‘very
satisfied’ with the outcome of the second stage was 43%. The corresponding proportion in
the group with a wide disparity between expectation and achievement was only 26%. This
difference in satisfaction is significant at 10% (v2 = 3.11, P = 0.08), which hints at the
presence of a factor holding back satisfaction levels in the latter group.
Let us check whether this result holds up when we introduce a set of control variables
that may affect participants’ degree of satisfaction with YA. The most obvious factors to
include are YA itself as well as YN, which are expected to show opposite signs, because
participants’ SWB is likely to respond to the increase in Y from stage I to II. In addition,
the level of satisfaction reported after stage I has been taken up in the regression in order to
capture interpersonal differences in the marginal utility of additional income. Women from
poorer households can be expected to derive more satisfaction from a certain money gain
than women from not-so-poor families, for instance. Finally, possible ‘warm glow’ effects
from contributing to the group payoff should be controlled for, which motivates the
inclusion of (dA - dN)
ik.
The logistic regression results in Table 3 substantiate the claim that experiencing a wide
expectation gap—compared to a modest one—tends to imply a lower level of satisfaction.
The coefficient for the dummy representing this group is negative and significant. As
expected, YA enters the regression positively, while the opposite is true for YN. The other
two control variables fail to show a significant impact.
Table 2 Logistic regression:
probability of casting vote in
favour of agency
*Indicates significance at 10%
Variable Parameter
estimate
Odds ratio
estimate
Wald
chi-square
P value
Expectation gap
Moderate 0.85* 2.3 2.89 0.089
Wide -0.69* 0.5 2.96 0.085
ak -0.42 1.6 0.11 0.739
dik 1.89 6.6 1.18 0.277
Puri 0.50 1.6 1.99 0.158
Constant 0.09 1.1 0.01 0.941
n = 156
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.13
v2 = 15.7 (P \ 0.01)
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5 An Aspiration-based Interpretation
In this section we present a tentative explanation for the result that participants experi-
encing a modest expectation gap seem particularly eager to continue to make their own
decisions, despite the fact that achievements did not fully meet expectations. The expla-
nation is based on the notion of aspirations level, a well-established concept in psychology
that refers to ‘‘a subjectively established goal for achievement’’ (Karlsson et al. 2004,
p. 755). This in turn acts as a crucial reference point for the level of satisfaction with actual
achievements (McBride 2007).
Early empirical work on aspirations (Irwin 1944) established that aspiration levels are
positively correlated with expectation levels, where the former tend to exceed the latter.
This is also reflected in Kahneman’s (2000) definition of an aspiration level as ‘‘a value on
a scale of achievement or attainment that lies somewhere between realistic expectation and
reasonable hope’’ (p. 687). Studies on aspirations have paid little attention to expectations
as a determinant of aspirations, however. The literature has mainly focussed on two other
determinants, i.e., the impact of past outcomes through adaptation and that of outcomes
achieved by others through social comparisons.8 A notable exception is a recent experi-
mental study by McBride (2007), who tests the importance of expectations relative to that
of past outcomes and outcomes of referent others for how individuals set aspirations. His
experiment reveals that ‘‘the largest factor in payoff aspirations is the subject’s expected
payment, which comprises the primary factor a subject considers when deciding whether or
not her achievement is satisfactory or dissatisfactory’’ (p. 34). Occasionally the importance
of expectations is implicitly acknowledged in the happiness literature. For instance, Van
Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004, p. 79) observe that ‘‘[f]or most people expectations
will define a too high aspiration level and this generates disappointment’’. It may therefore
be the case that the relevant factor in our experiment is in fact that of aspiration gap rather
than expectation gap as such, although the latter is an important cause of the former.
Ray (2006) has formulated an interesting theory on how aspiration gaps affect people’s
future-oriented behaviour. The main idea is that if the gap is not too large, an individual
has a strong impetus to close it in the near future and is therefore willing to exert costly
effort today. On the other hand, if the aspiration gap is sufficiently wide, efforts to invest in
attaining the aspiration level in the future become minimal, since ‘‘the overall journey is
Table 3 Logistic regression:
probability of being ‘‘very
satisfied’’ with YA
***, ** and * indicate
significance at 1, 5 and 10%,
respectively
Variable Parameter
estimate
Odds ratio
estimate
Wald
chi-square
P value
Wide expectation gap -0.85* 0.4 3.16 0.075
YA 0.12* 1.0 3.00 0.084
YN -0.56*** 0.9 8.36 0.004
Degree of reported
satisfaction with YN
0.37 1.5 0.83 0.361
(dA - dN)
ik 1.02 2.8 0.44 0.506
Constant 3.11** 1.5 4.23 0.040
n = 108
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.19
v2 = 15.3 (P \ 0.01)
8 See Stutzer (2004) for an overview.
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too long, and therefore not worth undertaking in the first place’’ (p. 412). He refers to this
as ‘‘the curse of frustrated aspirations’’ or aspiration failure. According to Ray, those who
do not experience an aspiration gap also suffer from aspiration failure in a sense, since
there is little incentive for this group either to invest in raising outcomes in the future. This
suggested inverted U-shape relation between aspiration gap and the level of incentive to
attain one’s aspired level in the future through exerting additional effort is consistent with
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory. The S-shaped value function in prospect
theory exhibits low marginal utility from improvements in outcomes in the region far
below the reference point, high marginal utility when approaching the reference point and
low marginal utility again above the reference point. The curse of frustrated aspirations,
which causes individuals with wide gaps to abandon one’s aspirations altogether and
triggers behaviour characterized by minimal effort towards generating future improve-
ments, is known in psychology as ‘‘the starting problem’’ (Heath et al. 1999, p. 89).
Although admittedly somewhat speculative, we believe that Ray’s theory offers a
plausible explanation of the observed voting behaviour in our field experiment or, at least,
that similar processes are at work. Participants whose expectations were too optimistic, but
not dramatically so, may have a lot to gain in terms of satisfaction from making a new
attempt at attaining the aspired payoff level. This challenge can only be undertaken when
voting in favour of remaining with agency. By contrast, incentives to do so may be
seriously flawed for both those with a negative gap as well as those with a wide positive
gap, since the experience in stage II proved either insufficiently challenging or too
discouraging.
6 Conclusion
The development literature tends to portray the enhancement of poor people’s capabilities
as a more virtuous objective than trying to improve their subjective well-being. This paper
started out from the premise that it is risky to ignore subjective well-being even in case one
decides to embrace the capability approach, if not only because negative changes in
subjective wellbeing may thwart the process of building capabilities, such as signalled by
Biswas-Diener (2002) in the case of empowerment. In particular, this paper has explored
one concrete mechanism that is put forward in the literature as potentially responsible for
an SWB failure triggering disempowering attitudes among poor women, which is the
presence of unrealistic expectations.
Our field experiment with a number of women self-help groups in India provides
evidence that this suggestion in the literature may be warranted. It is observed in the game
that if the gap between expectations and achievements becomes too wide, the valuation of
agency tends to go down. Moderate expectation shortfalls on the other hand seem to have
the opposite effect and foster a stronger degree of commitment to future empowerment.
The validity of these results is subject to potential caveats of the experimental design,
however.
A drawback of the experiment is that individuals’ risk attitudes may have played an
interfering role. Relatively risk-loving individuals obtain more intrinsic utility from the
game of chance (stage I) for a given payoff than more risk-averse types and can therefore
be expected to be more inclined to vote in favour of ‘throwing a die’. If the risk-loving
(risk-averse) types are concentrated -perhaps due to some overlapping character trait- in
the group with wide (moderate) expectation gap, our results could be partly driven by
differences in risk attitudes. While we have no direct information on risk attitudes, we do
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not find a significant difference in satisfaction levels after the risky stage (I) between the
groups with a moderate and wide gap (Mann–Whitney test; z = -1.15, P = 0.25). This
holds even after controlling for YN and dN. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the
game with agency (stage II) entails substantial risk as well, as the behaviour of fellow
group members is uncertain and deviating players can cause a sizeable drop in payoff. A
related caveat concerns the possibility that participants enjoyed playing the game,
regardless of this being governed by chance or own agency, and therefore more inclined to
vote for two extra rounds (non-agency) rather than one (agency). It is not clear, however,
why this preference should be systematically correlated with the size of one’s expectation
gap.
More fundamentally, one might entertain doubts as to whether setting expectations with
respect to outcomes in real life is subject to similar processes as doing so in the case of a
simple game, since the stakes are much lower in the latter. We feel that this is a legitimate
question that requires further study, but the experiment conducted by McBride (2007) on
aspirations is encouraging in this respect. He finds that ‘‘aspirations operate even with
respect to relatively small experiment payoffs’’ (pp. 5–6). Despite the necessary reserva-
tions, we believe our exploratory results warrant more work on the effect of expectations
on the success of development interventions and their potential to create virtuous cycles of
empowerment. Preferably, this should be studies of a longitudinal character that monitor
beneficiaries over a longer period. In addition, such studies should ideally be able to
include personality dimensions that we might expect to be systematically related to a
person’s valuation of agency, such as risk attitude and time preferences, individual
modernity, and levels of self-esteem and self-efficacy. If such more rigorous studies would
corroborate our results, interesting implications are to be drawn for development inter-
ventions, as till now their design ‘‘rarely addresses subjective factors such as the gap
between expectation and achievement from program participation’’ (Ahmed et al. 2001,
p. 1962). The lack of attention for these factors entails the risk of swelling the ranks of
‘frustrated achievers’, at least in the short and medium run.9
With regard to the current dispute between the supporters of the capability and hap-
piness approach to well-being, the paper purports to stress that the choice for either the
cultivation of capabilities or the promotion of happiness unlikely implies a conventional
trade-off. Embracing one of these as the prime aim does not simply require a willingness to
accept a possible negative impact on the other. The capability supporters, for instance,
should not only acknowledge the risk of a loss in subjective well-being in the process of
cultivating capabilities, but also the risk that if this loss exceeds some critical level, it may
undermine the process itself.
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Appendix: Protocol of ‘Empowerment Game’ (original instructions in Oriya)
Welcome to all of you. The game that we will be playing for the next hour is about making
decisions that not only affect yourself, but affect others as well. As members of a self-help
group, you often take such type of decisions, for example when you decide to contribute to
group savings or whether to take out a loan from the savings account. Please note that the
game, which we are about to explain, is not a test, so there is no wrong or right thing to do.
However, it is important that you think about your decisions carefully, because what you
decide affects the entire group. In the game you will earn a certain amount of money as a
group. The rupees that you earn will go into the group’s savings account (a bowl clearly
marked ‘‘group savings account’’ is shown to participants). Each of you will be able to
benefit equally from the money that you manage to win, regardless of who ‘earns’ it in the
game. The money is provided by an organization in the Netherlands, so you do not play
with your own money and therefore cannot lose anything.
The game works as follows. Each of you has received a small purse. In the purse you
will find 7 coins. Each of you has coins of a different colour (green, red, black, white, blue
etc.). You will be asked to put a certain number of your coins in the pot. When all of you
have done so, we will thoroughly mix all the coins in the pot and blindly draw two coins
from it. If one of your coins is taken out, you will make a contribution to the group savings
account. How many rupees you earn for the group depends on the number of coins that you
kept (i.e., that you did not put in the pot). The more coins you kept, the higher the
contribution to the savings account. The rules of the game are shown in Table 4.
Hence, if you put more coins in the pot, the higher your chance that you will earn
something for the group. At the same time, if you put less coins (and keep more), you can
earn larger amounts of money. Note that if the second coin that is drawn from the pot is of
the same colour as the first one, it will be disregarded and a third one will be drawn instead
(if necessary drawing continues until we have two coins of a different colour).
At the end of the game session we will count how many rupees you have earned in total
and hand the money over in cash to the group’s secretary.
First we will play 3 rounds of this game in which you have little influence over how
many coins to keep. Each of you rolls a die and the number that comes up is the number of
coins that will go into the pot. Let us see how it works. This is not yet for real. (practice
rounds with die).
After playing 3 rounds like this, we take away the die and you will be able to make your
own choice concerning how many coins to put in the pot and how many to keep. We will
play another 3 rounds without die. The only thing to remember is that you cannot put all
seven coins (keep at least one) and not keep all seven (put at least one). Please keep in
mind that you decide on how many coins to keep without discussing this with your
Table 4 The rules of the
empowerment game
Number of coins kept Contribution to group’s savings
account (in Rs.)
1 5
2 10
3 15
4 20
5 25
6 30
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neighbour. It is your own individual decision. Let us first try this out as well, without real
money. (practice rounds without die).
Now we are going to play for real. First, we will play with the die for 3 rounds.
(Play out 3 rounds with participants rolling a die. Each round two coins are drawn
randomly from the pot in public, the colour of the coins is announced as well as the
respective contribution to the savings account according to the rules of the game. The
rupees earned per round are added to the symbolic ‘group savings account’. The total
payoff over the 3 rounds is calculated and communicated to the participants).
As a group you earned Rs. X in total over these 3 rounds.
Before giving you real decision power, I would like to know two things from each of
you individually.
1. How satisfied are you with the amount that you managed to earn as a group over the
first 3 rounds? (Elicit satisfaction level of each participant. Possible responses include
‘‘not at all satisfied’’, ‘‘not so satisfied’’, ‘‘rather satisfied’’ and ‘‘very satisfied’’).
2. How many rupees do you expect you will manage to earn as a group in the next 3
rounds, where you can freely decide how many coins to keep? The person whose
expectation comes closest to the amount that you actually earn will receive a small
gift. Please do not discuss your expectation with other group members. (Elicit
expectations regarding payoff).
(Play out 3 rounds with participants deciding freely on number of coins to keep.
Otherwise same procedure as in rounds with die).
As a group you earned Rs. X in total over these 3 rounds.
Again I would like you to indicate how satisfied you are with the amount of money that
you managed to earn as a group over the past 3 rounds. [Elicit new satisfaction level of
each participant (same response categories)].
Now let us check who has won the small prize for making the best guess regarding the
total earnings over the past 3 rounds without die. (Announce person whose expected payoff
was closest to actual payoff and hand over small gift).
To conclude the game, we offer you the following choice. Either we play one extra
game in which you can freely choose the number of coins that you would like to keep
(i.e., without die), or play two extra games by rolling a die, as we did before. You decide
by voting. Each of you receives two voting cards and your purse is the ballot box. If you
prefer to play one extra round without die, you put card 2 in your purse, together with
one of your coins, and put card 1 head-down on the floor in front of you. Alternatively,
if you prefer to play two extra rounds with die, you put card 1 in your purse, together
with one of your coins, and put card 2 head-down on the floor. Once you have cast your
vote, we collect the purses as well as the cards on the floor. All cards in the purses will
be counted. If there are more cards 1, we will play two extra rounds with die, whereas if
there are more cards 2, we will play one extra round without die. In case of a tie, a coin
will be tossed to decide for one or the other. Please be sure that others will not find out
how you voted.
[Announce majority decision and play out corresponding round(s)]
Card 1        Card 2
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In total, as a group, you managed to add Rs. X in this final round (or final rounds in case
majority vote cast in favour of die). This makes in total, together with all the previous
rounds we played, X Rupees. We will add this amount to the group’s savings account.
(Hand over total payoff to group’s secretary). Congratulations and thank you very much
for your participation!
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